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proof is mine. I shall attempt to meet that burden in two stages. Part I discusses some evidence on adolescent crime as group behavior that emerged from the pioneering studies of the Chicago School in the 1920s, and supplements this rich information with more recent crime specific estimates of group criminality. Part II catalogues some of the things we do not know as a consequence of ignoring the obvious. While these findings were dramatic, they were not surprising. A 1923 study of theft offenders in the same court had found that nine out of ten males charged with theft were believed to have committed their offenses in groups. More recent data on the relationship between groups and adolescent criminality are needed for two reasons. First, 1928 city. The authors of one textbook on criminology observe how "quaint" the Shaw and McKay "delinquents seem to us today, in their knickerbockers and cloth caps and pre-Atomic innocence." ' 3 Furthermore, while group activity is associated with most juvenile delinquency, there is a tendency to revert to individualistic models when discussing serious crime. Modem evidence is available on the predominance of groups as a distinctive aspect of adolescent criminality, including the serious offenses that are the focus of recent concern about youth crime policy. Table 1 shows data collected from a sample of robbery victims in the National Crime Panel in 1973. * Cases in which offenders were identified as mixed age groups deleted.
I. KIDS, GROUPS AND CRIME
For present purposes, the National Crime Panel data are deficient in two aspects. Since the method of the survey was to ask victims to guess the ages of offenders, it was necessary to use crude age categories. Robberies committed by offenders "under 21" are hardly homogeneous events. The second shortcoming of the National Crime Panel data is that when victims are asked to guess ages, a substantial number of incorrect guesses may produce a random error factor that would mute any difference in pattern between younger and older offenders because of improper classification. Despite its drawbacks, the National Crime Panel data show that the relationship between the offender's age and group robbery is striking. Slightly more than a third of the robberies committed by offenders under 21 are committed by a single assailant compared with 61 percent of those robberies where the victim believes the offender was over 21. At the other end of the distribution, younger offenders commit five times as many victimizations in groups of four or more than do older offenders.
More precise data on youth criminality are available from the recent Vera Institute of Justice analysis of the delinquency jurisdiction of New York's Family Court. Figure 3 is an analysis of a sample of cases leading to court referral of offenders under age 16 and thus eligible for Family Court processing in New York City. This figure is comparable to the information presented in the first Shaw and McKay analysis. The Vera sample counts each alleged delinquent as a separate case. Thus, if two juveniles are referred for one robbery, this will result in two cases of group robbery while a single 15-year-old arrested for robbery counts as only one case. For this reason, the New York data overstate the number of offenses that are the product of group participation, but the method allows direct comparison with the Shaw With the exception of assault and rape (n=8), the bar charts bear what can only be called a striking resemblance to each other and to the theft estimates that emerged from the Chicago area studies. The predominance of group crime in this sample of young adolescent offenders (under 16) is similar to the earlier studies ofjuvenile theft, but occurs across a wide variety of offenses. For these age groups, the youthfulness of the offender appears to predict group participation more effectively than the nature of the offense.
The New York data were not coded in a way that could replicate the pre-computer precision of Shaw and McKay's distribution of theft offenses by number of offenders. 5 However, a sample of armed robbery arrests referred to Juvenile Court in Los Angeles collected by the Rand Corporation does permit this further detail, as shown in Figure 4 . In the Rand sample, 18 out of 103 robbery incidents attributable to juveniles involved lone offenders. The 97 robbery incidents for which the number of offenders was coded provide a potential pool of over 225 robbery arrests, and about a third of the incidents involved three or more offenders. The Los Angeles robbery data supplement the broader New York sample in several respects. First, the way in which the data were coded permits us to move closer to "offender to offense" ratios. the importance of this data to criminological theories about delinquent behavior. Empirical studies documenting adolescent crime abound. 6 The criminological literature discussing the implications of "dyadic," "triadic," and "other group" conformations is extensive. Whatever else may be said of modern criminology, the role of "male juvenile delinquency as group behavior" is acknowledged as fundamental, and the extent to which different types of criminality exhibit similar characteristics is well-known, although the New York and Los Angeles data presented earlier provide us with larger numbers of serious offenses than many modern delinquency studies.
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This well-known pattern has important implications for contemporary research dealing with crime statistics, general deterrence, incapacitation, the construction of models of criminal behavior, the study of criminal careers, and efforts to reform sentencing practices in juvenile and criminal courts. These relatively recent research subspecialties are the intellectual next-door neighbors to traditional studies of crime and delinquency. Lately, however, the neighbors have not been speaking to each other.
(1) ESTIMATING THE PROPORTION AND VOLUME OF SERIOUS YOUTH CRIME No one doubts that young offenders account for a disproportionate share of most serious crimes. But the question is, how large a share? This cannot be answered with current data. The evidence for this assertion goes beyond fashionable doubts about a "dark figure" of crime or of offenders. The current state of the art for estimating the youth share of serious crime is:
(a) to establish the percentage of persons under 18 or 21 arrested for a particular offense; and (b) to assume, explicitly or implicitly, that the percentage distribution of arrests accurately reflects the percentage distribution of crimes. 
Geis 1965).
7 The number of unambiguously serious, particularly violent, offenses in the typical self report study is quite small. The Philadelphia cohort data apparently include larger numbers of homicide arrests, and rape arrests (14 and 44 respectively). See M. WOLFGANG, R. FIGLIO & T. SELLIN, DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT 68-99 (1972). As the authors note, the method of scoring used in this study does not provide information on how many events these arrests represent. Id. at 23-24. A separate accounting of armed robbery or assault with deadly weapons was not published. The 193 robbery arrests in the Philadelphia cohort were not classified by event or seriousness, other than in seriousness scores. By contrast, the Rand juvenile court study reported 253 armed robbery arrests that resulted in the 104 case sample which is the basis for Figure 4 .
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HeinOnline --72 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 873 1981 In the process of passing the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974,8 the very first thing that the United States Congress found was that juveniles account for almost half the arrests for serious crimes in the United States today.
9 One problem with inferring that juveniles account for half of all serious crime from these statistics is that the crude heterogeneous categories used in crime and arrest reporting lump serious and relatively minor offenses under single rubrics, such as robbery or assault. 10 A second problem is that younger offenders who are arrested in groups are counted two, three or even four times in single offense data far more commonly than are older offenders. The compound effect of treating minor and major offenses with equal statistical dignity in multiple offender counts is illustrated by Figure 5 , adapted from the previously discussed National Crime Panel data based on robbery victim reports. Offenders under 21 comprise slightly over 60 percent of all the sample's "robbers," slightly over half of all "robberies," and less than a third of robberies committed with firearms. Figure 5 is only the beginning. The estimates contained there use [Vol. 72
the twenty-first birthday as a cut-line, while juvenile court jurisdiction typically ends on or before the offender's eighteenth birthday. The statistics used to compile the congressional findings of fact are FBI estimates of arrests under age 18.11 Since the rate of robbery arrests increases with age and the proportion of robberies committed with firearms also increases as a function of age, the proportion of firearm robbery events attributable to "juveniles" could plausibly range as low as 10 percent.
In dealing with currently available statistics, using hedge phrases like "could plausibly range" is well-advised. We simply do not know the youth share of particular forms of criminal activity, and we cannot use arrest statistics to derive estimates with acceptable margins of error.
(2) MEASURING ARREST AND PUNISHMENT RISKS IN THE STUDY OF GENERAL DETERRENCE
The past decade has witnessed a resurgence of interest in the general deterrent effect of the threat of criminal sanctions, and a variety of efforts to study deterrence by comparing crime rates and punishment levels over time or between jurisdictions.
12 Attempts to use existing aggregate data on offenses, arrests, and punishments are confounded by the overlapping jurisdictions of juvenile and criminal courts, and it is unlikely that researchers can use arrest statistics to "unconfound" matters.
The problem can be illustrated by examining common methods of estimating the risks of punishment and apprehension that are used to measure the credibility of threats in deterrence studies. The "risk of punishment" reported in Figure 6 is often used and fundamentally flawed.' 3 By expressing adult prison admissions as a proportion of total reported offenses, "risk of punishment" measures no one's actual risk of punishment and will systematically be reduced as the proportion of juvenile offenses to total offenses increases. If juveniles are responsible for a large number of marginally serious offenses that either may or may not end up classified as a particular index offense, variations in police reporting and classification practices, as well as variations in the ratio of juvenile to adult offenses, will produce negative correlations between crime rates and the risk of punishment that have nothing to do with general deterrence. 14 11 Juvenile Justice Act, supra note 8, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (1974 INCAPACITATION (FINAL REPORT 1978) , for a summary of deterrence literature and methods.
13 See id. at 99-103 for a list of more than a dozen studies that use risk variable displayed in Figure 6 .
14 A particular fear with respect to statistics that generate "artificial deterrence" is that Measuring the risk of apprehension by comparing total gross arrests to total gross offenses in any particular crime category generates similar problems. The measure is of two separate risks of arrest that cannot be segregated and a pool of offenses that represents an unknown admixture of juvenile and adult offenses with varying degrees of severity. Unless the mixture of adult and juvenile crimes and risks does not vary over time or from city to city, the result of this mixing will confound attempts to measure deterrent effects.
Under such circumstances, variations in the age distribution of crime or in police policy can successfully masquerade as variations in sentencing policy until we can separately estimate juvenile and adult offense rates. But the lesson of Figure 5 is that using the age distribution of arrests to attempt this segregation will not succeed. For this reason, it seems unlikely that comparative studies using aggregate data can measure true risks.15
The logic of incapacitation is straightforward: lock up people who would otherwise commit crimes and the general community will experience a lower crime rate.
1 6 But selecting the appropriate candidates for incapacitation and estimating the number of crimes saved proves to be a "junk crimes" and "junk arrests," defined as crimes and arrests that are not likely to receive serious sanctions in the adult system, are the major share of variations between cities and over time. If this is the case, variations in juvenile arrests rates could thoroughly confound efforts to assess the general deterrent impact of criminal sanctions over time or in comparative studies.
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The alternative to this approach, however, is attractive. Given the difference between juvenile and adult criminal sanctions for similar behavior, deterrence theory that can exploit wide variations in the age of jurisdiction, and variations in patterns for similar crime to discover whether individuals respond to differences in risks when they cross over the borderline between juvenile and criminal justice at varying points in their criminal careers. 17 Simply stated, if one of three offenders is taken out of circulation for one year, we have no current basis for estimating whether, or to what extent, the crime rate is affected. If all three offenders are incapacitated, it is possible to estimate "crime saved" as a joint function of the crimes these offenders would have committed alone and with each other, but not in other groups. Using current methods of incapacitative accounting, however, assigning each member of each group eve0, crime they would have committed together or in other groups creates a form of double and triple counting that overestimates "crime saved" in the group-prone adolescent years. The published studies that purport to measure incapacitation effects have not made serious efforts to correct for this bias. Frequently, attempts to impose simplifying models to explain variations in particular offenses cannot succeed because of the diversity of behaviors subsumed in a single crime category. Robbery is a case in point, and an illustrative example concerns the determinants of whether firearms are used in robbery events. Working from a sample of robberies in Boston, John Conklin concluded "robbing with accomplices reduces the need to carry a weapon for self-protection, since the group itself acts as a functional equivalent of a weapon."' 8 His data evidently did not control for age when relating weapon use to the number of offenders involved. Analyzing National Crime Panel data, Philip J. Cook found the opposite to be true: "Guns are less likely to be used by single offenders than by multiple offenders and. . . this pattern holds for subgroups of offenders. . . as well as for the entire sample. . . ! While it is plausible that a team of offenders has less 'need of a gun' than a single offender for a certain type of victim, the data suggest that teams of offenders tend to choose stronger victims. It may not be necessary to referee this particular dispute, because both Conklin and Cook are correctly describing the behavior of different subsets of robbery offenders-Professor Cook's analysis applies with force to unpremeditated robberies by young offenders. These patterns cannot be detected, however, by cross-tabulating weapon use and number of offenders for the total sample of robberies, as shown in Figure   7 .
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It turns out, however, that this flat pattern is misleading. Looking at these data without controlling for age is precisely the wrong way to examine the National Crime Panel data because of the greater likelihood that younger offenders (a) will rob in groups and (b) will use guns less often whether or not they rob in groups.
20 Table 2 displays the results of separate analysis patterns of guns use and number of offenders by age.
For reported victimizations where all of the offenders were thought to be over 21, there is a modest increase in gun use as the size of the group increases. For offenders under 21, their youth is a much more powerful predictor of gun use than the number of robberies. Consistently, gun use is about a third of adult levels across all categories of offender group size. Thus, it may be true that young offenders find "courage in numbers" when a pre-existing group spontaneously decides to commit a robbery. This is consistent with the low rate of gun use and the low rate of single offender robberies among younger offenders. Older offenders engage in more planning and exhibit different target selection and accom-plice selection patterns. For planned offenses, the target of the robbery has a substantial impact on the size of the group and the weapon used. In spontaneous robberies, the group and armaments have been determined before the target is selected, but failure to control for age of offender completely obscures these patterns. 
(5) COMPREHENDING CRIMINAL "CAREERS"
Almost all American adolescents commit crimes at some point in the transition to adulthood. Many of these offenses are trivial; most of the time, adolescent criminality does not represent the beginning of a pattern of habitual criminality that will extend through adulthood. It is, however, also true that the majority of those who persist in patterns of predatory crime through early adulthood have started young.
2 '
In recent years the study of criminal careers has been the subject of renewed interest and changing focus. For decades, criminologists have been interested in factors associated with desisting from or continuing to commit criminal offenses. 2 2 Recently, such studies have been undertaken with ambitions to contribute to policy: Finding characteristics that predict continued criminality is now seen as a path to sentencing policy, particularly sentencing policies that emphasize the incapacitative effects of incarcerative sanctions. 23 The distinctive group character of adolescent criminality may provide a perspective that can increase the capacity of research to empirically test the degree to which prior behavior predicts future offenses. At some point in adolescence or early adult development, most of those who have committed offenses in groups either cease to be offenders or continue to violate the law, but for different reasons and in different configurations. Either of these paths is a significant change from prior behavior. The transition from group criminality to noncriminal individual behavior is obviously worthy of sustained study. The equally important transition from adolescent to adult patterns of criminal behavior should also be a particularly important period in the analysis of criminal careers.
At the outset it is important to identify when transitions from juvenile to adult criminality and from adolescent criminality to desistance occur. This is not to suggest that the search is for a particular day when crime is abandoned or when patterns of criminality change; rather, both transitions should be expected to be processes that occur over substantial periods of time, and occur at different stages in the life history of different individuals. But identification and study of these transitional periods, in individual cases and cohorts, could enhance our understanding of criminality as a developmental event and sharpen the empirical focus of the questions to be asked in predicting future criminality.
One critical contribution of this focus would be to discriminate be- tween predictive attributes or events that occur early in an adolescent career and those predictive events that occur more proximately to the transition out of crime or into different patterns of crime. A complete accounting scheme should separately consider:
(1) Characteristics of the individual, such as age, location, and family structure that antedate or accompany the early adolescent years;
(2) Aspects of the individual's involvement in early adolescent crime, including the kind of crime, age at first arrest, the type of group participating in crime, and the nature of the individual's role--dominant or passive-in adolescent group activities; and (3) Events or influences that occur later in adolescence that predict the nature of the change in the individual behavior.
Aggregate statistics on the distribution of arrests suggest that the transition out of criminality is not a random event spread over the late teens and through the mid-twenties, but rather clusters in late adolescence. However, my previous remarks suggest that aggregate arrest statistics are an insufficient foundation for studying this phenomenon. Those years where gross arrest rates decline are also periods when arrest statistics underestimate the extent of criminal participation when arrest rates of older age groups are compared to those of younger groups. When looking for the transition to "adult style" individual or planned group crime, there is no reason to select a priori any single one or two year period when we expect such a transition to occur. Case history studies and cohort samples can collect data on the nature of each individual offense coming to the attention of the police, 28 and other supplemental methods, such as self-report studies, can be used to determine the period of transition, its duration, and its significant concomitants.
(6) DETERMINING APPROPRIATE SANCTIONS FOR YOUTH CRIME Statistics on the sanctions adminstered to young offenders in juvenile or family courts strike many observers as a classic instance of social non-control. The most impressive numbers come from New York City, a criminogenically congested urban area where only offenders under sixteen are referred to the Family Court. One study of.nearly 4,000 juvenile robbery arrests found that more than half of these charges were dismissed without formal referral to the Family Court, and over threequarters of all charges are eventually dismissed. 29 Barbara Boland and James Q. Wilson cite the end result of this study with evident disap-27 For age specific arrest estimates (with insufficient warnings about this difficulty), see F.E. ZIMRING, supra note 21, Table 1 
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HeinOnline --72 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 881 1981 proval, "In short, only three percent of the juveniles arrested for robbery and only seven percent of the juveniles actually tried in Family Court received any form of custodial care, whether with a relative, in a Juvenile Home or training school, or in an adult prison. '30 In Los Angeles, another study estimated the chances of a formal determination of delinquency at 17 for every 100 arrests. 3 1 This kind of statistical portrait lends itself nicely to fears of an army of young violent offenders roaming the streets unchecked. The observer may also be tempted to conclude that the philosophy and youth welfare policies of the juvenile court are the explanation for such epidemic leniency.
Serious study of the relationship between age, crime, and punishment has only recently been undertaken. But the early returns suggest that the forces that produce such apparently alarming examples of "case mortality" are at once more complicated and less dependent on juvenile court philosophy than many had supposed. The animating philosophy of child protection in the juvenile court undoubtedly reduces the number of arrests that result in formal adjudications of delinquency and post-adjudication commitment in secure facilities. However, a number of juvenile court policies not clearly related to leniency toward the young also contribute to high rates of informal dispostion. In marginal cases, police might arrest juvenile offenders expecting the case to be "adjusted" at intake but relying on the arrest as a sanction and an opportunity for compiling a dossier. 3 3 The juvenile court's well documented use of detention after arrest as a substitute for formal adjudication represents a troublesome social control device that is not visible when only the post-trial sanctions are examined. This is important because nationwide detention is about seven times as frequent as post-adjudication commitment to secure facilities. 3 4 It is difficult to view detention practices as part of a sentimental general theory of youth protection.
Aggregate statistics on juvenile arrests reflect more than the distinctive policies and style of the contemporary juvenile court. The pervasive problem of the adolescent accessory aggravates the difficulty of determining appropriate sanctions for youth crime. One useful example occurs early in the cohort study volume, when its authors are discussing the proper assessment of "seriousness scores":
Let us suppose that three boys have committed a burglary. They range in age from 12 to 16 years. The oldest is the instigator and leader who actively committed the offense with one of the others: the youngest is an unwilling partner who was ignorant of the plan but was present because he happened to be with the others at the start of what began as an idle saunter through the streets of the neighborhood. Suppose the event is given a score of 4. Does this score, when applied to each participant, accurately measure the involvement of each? Should the oldest boy and his active partner be assessed this score, but the youngest given a lower one?
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In any system of justice that considers the magnitude of the harm done and the degree of the individual offender's involvement, the attempt to determine an appropriate sanction will confront the same difficulties as the researcher attempting to determine an appropriate score. In discussing this case, Wolfgang and his colleagues state that all three offenders are equally guilty "from a legal point of view." '3 8 This statement is correct but potentially misleading. Assuming a trier of fact determines that the youngest was a reluctant but voluntary partner who aided and abetted the offense, all three adolescents can be found delinquent in a juvenile court. 39 generate criminal liability for the appropriate degree of burglary in a criminal court through the magic of the doctrine of accessorial liability.40 But prosecutorial discretion in selecting cases for prosecution, determining charges, and pressing for punishment combined with judicial discretion in determining sentences in both juvenile and criminal courts creates ample opportunity for differences in punishment policy that are not reflected in the formal substantive law of either crime or delinquency.
When sentencing policy is dispensed by a series of low visibility discretions, a system can have a policy toward accomplice problems in adolescence without announcing it, and not infrequently without knowing it. In the Rand study of the Los Angeles juvenile court, lone offenders arrested for armed robbery experienced a three-in-ten chance of commitment to the state's youth authority, while only thirteen percent of those who acted in groups received this most serious disposition available to the court. It seems plausible to suppose that much of this difference can be attributed to prosecutorial and judicial leniency toward individuals at the periphery of spontaneous adolescent crimes. But the discretionary decisions characteristic of juvenile justice hide rather than announce the real reasons they are made. This article's ambitions fall short of resolving the complicated set of problems generated by the juvenile accomplice; instead, it is sufficient for present purposes to note the novelty and importance of these issues in the study of dispositional policy toward youth crime and realistic efforts to reform the law. To study dispositional patterns in juvenile court without paying careful attention to policies toward group offenses seems foolhardy. To assign to each of the three youths arrested in the hypothetical burglary discussed above the same seriousness score, and to use that score to predict the level of sanctions, will create the impression that serious crimes go unpunished if any of the group is excused because his participation was relatively minor. 4 1 This kind of research procedure will also continue our ignorance about how participants in group crime are sanctioned.
Attempts to reform sentencing practices in the juvenile court, expecially efforts to lead sanctioning models away from the jurisprudence of treatment and toward concepts of making the punishment fit the (1930) . 41 This weakness characterizes any research procedure that converts events into seriousness scores and gives the total score to each offender as well as studies that use offense and arrest. See, e.g., M. WOLFGANG, R. crime, will find the myriad problems of sanctioning the adolescent accomplice very close to the top of any sensible priority list for deliberation. These issues are important because they confront whatever set of institutions will process young offenders in a majority of all cases. The issues are novel because the nature of group criminality in adolescence bears scant resemblance to the classic image of the criminal conspiracy or the conceptual foundations of the common law of accessorial liability. The intelligent law reformer thus must take a short course in criminology as a preliminary to setting his agenda. My own review of recent literature and debate suggests that this sequence of events is infrequent. 42 
CONCLUSION
The path of progress in social science proceeds more frequently from the general to the specific than the other way around. A survey of some of the difficulties generated by inattention to the special character of adolescent criminality bears an uncanny resemblance to a revised research agenda. Much that needs to be done can be done in the near future, using relatively straightforward methods of measurement on less than staggering budgets.
The criminological excursion reported in these pages illustrates a broader point: Those who regulate particular forms of human behavior, or study the effects of regulation, abstract themselves from the knowledge base of other social and behavioral sciences only at great cost. In an era when the study of public policy has become a discipline of its own, at a time when the study of law and legal institutions has developed prescriptive ambitions, the well-known secret is an occupational hazard of no small significance. 42 For example, two of the Juvenile Justice Standards volumes are closely related to juvenile court policy toward youth crime, but they contain no substantive analysis of the appropriate role of doctrines of accessorial liability, or conspiracy. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND SANCrIONS, supra note 39, INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, AMERICAN BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS RELATING TO DISPOSMON (tentative draft 1977) . While the role of peer pressure is not discussed, standard 3.4 argues against delinquency jurisdiction if a parent or guardian coerced a juvenile's participation in a criminal act, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND SANCTIONS, supra note 39, at 33, commentary. Further, the commentaries in these volumes contain no analysis of patterns of youth crime, the magnitude of the problem, or typologies of youth crime.
